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book, The Myth of Ownership, in which they attempt to argue that it is logically
impossible that one can have any entitlement to their pretax income. The first criticism
addresses their claim that based on a politically charged understanding of human nature
you cannot have property without government. Through the fields of psychology,
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that presents a serious hurdle to the Murphy and Nagel position. The second criticism
addresses their failure to define the scope of government in their book. In light of
cultures that have a strong conception of property, Murphy and Nagel are charged with
equivocating on the definition of government in order to make their argument hold. The
conclusion reached is that based on current research pertaining to human nature and a
brief anthropological study, the existence of government is not needed in order to have
property within a community.
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I. Introduction

Can property successfully exist in a society with little or no government? Being a
part of society that was founded on upholding a strong conception of private property,
our intuitions seem to answer with the affirmative. For example, imagine two people (Al
and Bill) are shipwrecked on an island. Al takes a branch from a tree and spends the day
carving it into a spear for catching fish. Bill then walks over to Al, takes the spear, and
begins to walk away with it. It seems that in this scenario Bill, even without living in a
legal society at the moment of the action, was wrong for taking the spear that Al labored
to make. The intuition against Bill taking the spear that Al made helps support the claim
that property is a natural right that has meaning regardless of any legal conventions to
define its boundaries. In short, entitlement to exclude others from an external object can
be established without a government. 1 This was the position John Locke posited in the
17th century, and it remains widely accepted to this day.
However, the appearance of a right being sacred doesn’t in fact make it so.
Thomas Nagel and Liam Murphy claim that property rights, like many other rights,
appear to be natural because of how pervasive they are in a society. They go on to claim
that property has no meaning or existence prior to a political society and it is only through
the existence of a government that the concept of property can have any practical
meaning and application (Murphy, Nagel 8-9). From this conception, it follows that we
are not morally entitled to any earnings we acquire in a political society through our
1

Regardless of how strong the intuition that supports the Lockean position is, in light of the vast criticisms
against natural property rights, there must be more involved in defending a natural rights position on
property than mere intuitions. I do not intend to defend it in light of the many criticisms it faces. I simply
intend to set the stage of the popular debate found in the philosophy of property so that I may present an
alternative.
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labor, because without a government, which depends on taxes to exist, there would be no
unified currency, no police force, no legal system, and most importantly to this essay, no
property rights. In light of this view, if Bill is wrong in taking the spear Al made, it is
only because the readers are projecting this socially engrained and legally established
conception of property onto the situation.
It is the purpose of this essay to provide two criticisms of Murphy and Nagel’s
position about the necessary role of government, specifically in regards to their claim that
property has no meaning outside the legal conventions defined by a government. The
first criticism will address their claim that a world without government would be a
Hobbesian nightmare. Their view of apolitical humanity lays the groundwork for their
argument, that government is necessary for stable property rights in any functioning
society. I argue that Murphy and Nagel fail to justify their Hobbesian view of human
nature. I draw on observations in anthropology, biology and psychology to show not
only that Murphy and Nagel’s position is unfounded, but also that the best evidence casts
human nature as sufficiently elastic as to allow for the existence of property without
government. My second criticism addresses Murphy and Nagel’s failure to define the
scope of what they mean by “government.” By focusing on numerous accounts of precolonial Native American tribes that had a strong sense of property rights with little or no
government, I show that Murphy and Nagel’s position is too bold and must be restated 2 .

2

I am grateful to Andrew Jason Cohen for suggesting this point.
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II. The Murphy and Nagel Position

Strictly speaking, “property” is a general concept used to define the rules
governing access to and control of external resources. There are various types of
property: e.g., collective property, which is the property of a collective in so far as a
consensus must be found in regards to decisions about the use of the group’s property.
Another type of property is public property, which is property that is open to any member
of a society. And yet another form of property is private property, which establishes
ownership of a resource in one member (or a group).
Within each branch of property just defined, there is a congruent concept that acts
as the fundamental basis for any and all types of property. To better understand what this
basis is, it will be helpful to compare property in light of mere “holdings.” A resource
can be defined as one’s holdings simply in virtue of what one is currently and literally
holding. In other words, a resource is the holding of, say, Al in so far as Al can
physically maintain position of it. However, if Bill comes along and takes the resource
either through brute force or surreptitiousness, then the resources taken from Al become
the holdings of Bill. Now, if Al was said to have property in the resource that Bill also
wants, then Bill’s behavior of forcefully taking the resource is deemed immoral and
illegal. 3 With property rights in a resource one maintains control of that resource without
having to physically hold it.
There appears to be a conceptually necessary condition present in any and all
types of property, which is not present in mere holdings: property in a resource entitles
3

This term is used very loosely and is contextually defined based on the society in question. Some
societies have strictly defined laws that outline the legal parameters of a lawful citizen’s behavior, while
other tribal societies have more of an informal understanding of what is acceptable behavior.
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the owner(s) of that resource exclusionary rights from any and all non-owners. The limit
and degree of the exclusionary rights can and do differ depending on the society;
however, regardless of the specific differences among various societies, where property is
found, the power to exclude non-owners must be present. How one acquires these
exclusionary rights in external objects and what is sufficient for the protection of these
rights is the primary source of debate within the philosophy of property.
Murphy and Nagel defend a position that requires them to add a further necessary
requirement to the definition of property: there can be no property without government,
and there can be no government without taxes. In light of this claim, one of the
fundamental aims of their book, The Myth of Ownership, is to prove that it is “logically
impossible that people should have any kind of entitlement to their pretax income”
(Murphy/Nagel, 32). The target of their book is the popular mentality that pervades most
capitalist societies, which they deem “everyday libertarianism.” On this view, people
believe—without any argument beyond a watered down version of a Lockean proviso—
that they have a valid moral claim to their pretax income. Their theory directly
challenges the strong intuitions that we have some degree of moral right to the income
which our labor creates. However, according to Murphy and Nagel, without a
government, which can only exist through a tax system, we could not have an income.
Therefore, to claim any entitlement beyond the legal conventions that define property
within a given society is not only both audacious and incorrect, it is a “logical
impossibility” (Murphy/Nagel, 32). This means that any moral intuitions we might have
that our labor warrants even a fraction of entitlement to that which we create or produce –
even if it is the promise of trading one’s labor for currency or items of interest – is greatly
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misguided. Instead, this common belief is the projection of a social convention beyond
the sphere in which it was created and properly applied.
When Murphy and Nagel claim it is logically impossible that one can have any
kind of entitlement to pretax income, they are basing this position on the idea that the
concept of property is logically dependent on the existence of government. According to
their argument, to prove that property can exist without governments would be like trying
to prove that bachelors can exist without the existence of men. In using such language,
Murphy and Nagel must show a logical contradiction involved with using the idea of
personal entitlement and pretax income.
The first step in their argument – there can be no property without government –
is the focus of this paper, for it is the most crucial, controversial and interesting piece of
their argument. Murphy and Nagel state that “there are no property rights antecedent to
the tax structure.” Property laws are the product of a set of laws and conventions, of
which the tax system forms a part” (Murphy/Nagel, 74). They further claim that it is
“logically impossible that people should have any kind of entitlement to their pretax
income.” In other words, not only is there no fraction of moral entitlement involved in
that which we use our labor to acquire, but it is conceptually impossible to imagine a
world in which we are entitled to our income without a government to establish the legal
convention of property rights and thus what allows for the possibility of an income.
Conceiving of a state of nature wherein a group of humans exist among each other
with a tacit convention of property is of course logically possible. There is no
contradiction in this occurrence both conceptually or, as I intend to prove in later
sections, historically. To use language in order to argue that this is a conceptual/analytic
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contradiction can only find merit in its rhetorical value, not in its truth. However, just
because it is logically possible that when I release the grip I have on, say, my pen it will
ascend to the sky instead of falling to the ground, this does not mean that it would be
wise to place a bet on the occurrence of this logical possibility. For if my entire
perception on reality included logical possibilities as explanations for what I perceive, my
life would truly be tortuous and nearly impossible to live. And just as it is logically
possible that I am a brain in vat, or that my pen will fly when I release my grip on it, or
that the entire universe sprung into existence 15 minutes ago, so is it logically possible
that property can exist without government.
In respecting the rules of logic, Murphy and Nagel must concede that it is
logically possible to have property without government, yet they can assert that the
probability of this occurrence is so minute, that it is practically impossible. In other
words, just as it is logically possible that my pen will fly when I release my grip on it, or
that the universe is only 15 minutes old, it is logically possible to have property without
government. However the question still remains whether the probability of property
without government is just as minute as my pen flying. In other words, is the probability
of a society with a working practice of property rights yet without government practically
impossible? I use the term practically possible for ideas that are logically possible, but so
remote in their possibility that it would be unwise to bet on their occurrence in reality.
Because property without government is not logically impossible, Murphy and
Nagel will be forced to both acknowledge and thus redefine their view on what
constitutes the necessary requirements of property, for government is not a necessary
requirement for its existence. However, they can fall back on the weaker, yet still very
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threatening position that property without government is practically impossible. They
could then assert the very convincing position that if we want to look at a practical theory
about the world in which we live, we can acknowledge the logical possibilities for the
philosophers, but we must work with our practical possibilities in order to get a better
understanding of our world. And in our practical world, it is improbable that we will find
an occurrence of property without government, and to argue that we can, is like the
philosopher trying to convince the medical doctor that he really doesn’t know that
someone’s test results reveal cancer because he doesn’t know that he is not dreaming
right now. Though such a revised position would not be as strong, it would still hold as
much practical weight as their prior argument. In other words, just because it is a logical
possibility that my pen will fly when I let go of it, it would be immensely unwise for
anyone to bet that this logical possibility will actually occur (and I, as anyone with a
practical sense, would and should apply this standard every time this bet is confronted).
Thus, though their claim about the logical requirements of property is obviously wrong, it
still presents serious practical concerns.
Weakening Murphy and Nagel’s argument to a practical level still leaves it
vulnerable to important challenges. Murphy and Nagel defend the practical impossibility
of property is through their conception of human nature. They advocate a Hobbesian
conception of human nature – one that lets them posit with confidence that there can be
no guarantee of property without government.
In this Hobbesian state-of-nature-story, our self-interested natures drive us to
fearsome and aggressive behaviors so vile there would be unimaginable chaos.
Furthermore, anyone desiring control over an object created she created through her labor
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would have to fight off many rivals. On this account, one can thus have possessions in a
state of nature, but without the legal system to define property, settle disputes and back
up each decision with sufficient coercive power, property would be practically
impossible. 4 With such a conception of human nature the existence of a government is
necessary to have not only property but also a peaceful coexistence (Murphy, Nagel 1617). And if their position on human nature is in fact correct then they have a very strong
case.
The second step in their argument claims that there can be no government without
taxes (Murphy, Nagel 58, 74). Murphy and Nagel believe that taxes are a necessary part
of the definition of property:
Since there are no property rights independent of the tax system, taxes cannot
violate those rights. There is no prima facie objection to be overcome, and the tax
structure, which forms part of the definition of property rights, along with laws
governing contract, gift, inheritance, and so forth, must be evaluated by reference
to its effectiveness in promoting legitimate societal goals… (Murphy and Nagel,
58)

For them, property can only exist within a government based society with the coercive
power to guarantee property rights. This power, according to Murphy and Nagel, needs
taxes to pay for the necessary costs needed to guarantee the possibility and use of
property. However, once again, it is logically possible that a government could fulfill
many of its functions without taxes, yet the probability of this scenario, if our conception
of government is limited to a market economy, seems practically impossible as well. In
order to function effectively, any large government needs resources to enact its authority

4

Hobbes is the extreme example of thinkers who hold a similar position on property rights. However, this
argument applies to any thinker whose theory of human nature may be more optimistic, yet still pessimistic
enough to disallow for the possibility of property in a state of nature. The classic example, which will be
discussed briefly, is David Hume.
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and allow for public goods. Property being a legal right, like any legal right, is
guaranteed publicly with resources paid for from the public purse.
Third (and therefore), citizens in a political community are not entitled to any of
their earnings (Murphy, Nagel 74). Entitlement outside of government is an empty
notion. Now, one could argue, as Locke did, that we have a moral right to the fruits of
our labor. Yet, in a state of nature, one might hold a Rousseauian conception of rights,
or, even worse, a Hobbesian conception of rights. Locke may be correct: we may
actually be morally entitled to the fruits of our labor, but if our moral property is
constantly in peril, the practical possibility of property is in doubt. However, I think
Murphy and Nagel would argue that we do not have a pre-political moral right to our
property, because government is a precondition of property. They seem to hold that
entitlement is a function of the law. Since it is a legal convention, our earnings do not
become our property in virtue of our labor, but only in virtue of government guarantees
and only after the public purse has left us some share it designates as private property. A
portion of income is needed to maintain the government, which in turn allows for
protected life, occupation, financial security, etc. Thus, according to Murphy and Nagel,
the moral story entitling one to the fruits of one’s labor is not, as Locke claimed,
“natural” or pre-political; it is instead contingent on the political background of a
community and justified by efficiency (Murphy/Nagel, 73-74).
Although they do not believe this is the most efficient overall system, the
government, according to Murphy and Nagel, is entitled to 100% of one’s income if it is
proven to lead to the most efficient system (Murphy/Nagel, 72-74). 5 Murphy and Nagel
do not think that this tax system would ever be justified, due to its inevitable inefficiency.
5

This point developed out of a conversation with Dr. Andrew Jason Cohen.
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However, it is important to note that they arrive at a justification for the general economic
system the majority of people in a capitalist society believe, yet through drastically
different means. Most people – everyday libertarians being the extreme example –
believe that they are morally entitled to some fraction of their pretax income, and believe
that the value of commodities should be a function of capitalist markets where people
freely exchange the goods to which they are entitled. Murphy and Nagel arrive at this
system through the mere fact that it is the most efficient society. Unlike the everyday
libertarians that would abhor the idea of a government that demands 100% of one’s
income based on the immoral nature of unjustified coercion, Murphy and Nagel would
allow for its existence if it can be proven to be the most efficient system.
To simplify their position, Murphy and Nagel present three claims when arguing
that property is logically dependent on the existence of government: (1a) Our income is a
form of property, (1b) there can be no property without government; (2) There can be no
government without taxes; (3) No one is (morally) entitled to their pretax income beyond
the scope of the government that creates and enforces a system of property.
The following section of this paper will confront their position about human
nature in the claim of their argument – there can be no property without government.
Although Murphy and Nagel do not make a direct claim about human nature as such,
they seem to presuppose that it innately tends toward conflict, so that without a
government to police our natural impulses to create chaos, we would invariably exist in a
vicious Hobbesian state of nature. Even though it has been shown that the existence of
government is not a logical requirement for the conception of property, it can be argued
that it is practically necessary in order to have property. It is through a pejorative account
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of human nature that this position can be asserted with confidence. In pulling from
various fields on what can be known about human nature, I intend to raise serious doubts
about the primary premise needed by Murphy and Nagel to argue that it is practically
impossible to have property without government. I will show that property is logically
independent from government by showing that property can be practically independent of
government.

III. Human Nature

The focus of this section will be the fundamental premise used to conclude that
there cannot be property without government. - i.e., “the no-government world is
Hobbes’s state of nature” (Murphy/Nagel, 16). That premise, in one way or another,
asserts a specific account of human nature which renders null the possibility of property
without an overarching power structure. Furthermore, I will argue that those who uphold
such a position overestimate the austerity of human nature, and ultimately makes the
error of assuming that the average individual in their society (or in societies like their
own) is the average individual for all societies. I will argue that human nature is more
malleable than Murphy and Nagel seem to suppose. I intend to show that human nature
is so adaptive that we are, for the most part, the products of our social environment. If
Murphy and Nagel are seemingly right in their premise that there can be no property
without government, it cannot be justified by the nature of all human beings constituted
in such a way that it renders this occurrence practically impossible. Instead, all they can
claim to show is that in some societies, people are socialized in such a way to believe that
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the role of government is needed in order to have property rights. But I show that certain
societies by the same token can and do respect property rights with little or no
government.
One could say that the truth about human nature is the holy grail of political
philosophy, and not be far off. If humans are in fact innately constituted in a certain way,
from that concrete and universal framework we can conclude how to structure a political
system, maximizing the most peaceful and harmonious society. However, this topic has
proven to be elusive and vague at best throughout the history of political philosophy. For
every theory about human nature, experience and/or history has shown counter examples.
It is with the utmost reluctance and humility that I venture to throw my hat in the
ring with those who have followed. However, if the possibility of natural property rights
is to be discussed in philosophy, this topic cannot be avoided.
Murphy and Nagel are not the first thinkers to defend the position that property
requires government. For centuries this camp has been strongly populated by many
brilliant minds, and nearly all of which have appealed to a certain conception of human
nature to defend their position. Because a society without a government can logically be
conceived to operate with a functioning system of property, those who uphold the
Murphy/Nagel position must fall back on human nature to account for the force of their
claim. Some philosophers have tried to side step this premise when making a similar
stand, but ultimately, when pressed, they had to make an assumption about human nature
to guarantee its full support. Thomas Hobbes overtly posited this position in the 17th
century, and it is through his distinctly pessimistic declarations about human nature that
necessitates a government for a functioning system of property (Hobbes, 78). David

13
Hume attempted to reach the same conclusion by revealing the lack of a logical
connection between people and objects. In other words, there is no intrinsic connection
between objects and people that would warrant them the right to convincingly claim that
the object is their property. In short, there is nothing natural about human property
(Hume, 315). This point reveals the logical disconnect between people and their claim to
an external object. There is nothing natural about the relationship between a person and
their property. Thus, more is needed in order to create such a relationship. However, for
Hume, this “something more” must be a government. We do not need a government to
create a convention of property, for any group of people can establish such a convention.
We need a government to guarantee this convention. This reason is because of his
account of human nature. He argued that the ‘contrariety’ of our passions and the
‘violence of others’ means that any situation in which I hold or use a resource is always
in danger of disruption (Hume, 313).
In a more recent example, Sustein and Holmes maintain a similar view in their
book, The Cost of Rights. However, just like those who preceded them, when pressed,
they argue that the legal convention of coercive government is required for meaningful
property.
Within its own framework, laissez-faire theory is helpless to explain the basis of
civilization, the general renunciation of violence by advantage-seeking
individuals and groups. Why do most American entrepreneurs hesitate to threaten
and kill their competitors? The theory of free markets, as it is currently taught in
American universities, tacitly assumes that the problems of short time horizons
and violent competition, characterizing the state of nature, have already been
solved. For the most part, in other words, the science of economics tacitly
presupposes the existence of an active and reliable system of criminal justice
(Sustein and Holmes, 71).
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If we are constituted to be a slave to our immediate passions and desires, as Hume
argues, or to be innately fearful and egoistic, as Hobbes argues, then the probability of
this society would be an impossible utopia, and they would, in fact, be correct in their
claim. Like those before them, Murphy and Nagel use human nature to support their
position on property. They argue that the idea of property in a state of nature could
never be actualized due to the level of chaos that would inevitably be present in a world
without the policing presence of a government. Here they seem to fall in line with a
Hobbesian account of human nature, which accounts for the unavoidable chaos found in a
life without a government.
Let’s assume that Murphy and Nagel’s position on property is true, and we in fact
do need a government to allow for the practical possibility of property. This view
presupposes two mutually incompatible theories about human nature. The first position
has a Hobbesian tone. It holds that, to some extent, human beings by nature are ill-suited
for cooperative behavior. They are inevitably prone to violence and conflict, and this
nature is unavoidable and characteristic to human beings as such. This position was first
outlined by Thomas Hobbes in the 16th century, and it is this camp that Murphy and
Nagel belong. A world without government would then be an environment unsuited for
property rights.
The second position on human nature that can ground Murphy and Nagel’s view
on property, unlike the first, is somewhat suspicious of universal statements about human
nature. Instead, it claims that humans are neither good nor bad when born; we have
malleable brains, which allow us through early development to easily adapt to our
surroundings. Thus, if we are not able to live peacefully in a world without government,
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it is not because we are naturally incapable of this feat, like the first theory posits; instead
we have been shaped by an environment (society) that has made us incapable of easily
making such a transition (if it were to arise). Human nature is plastic enough that
features of our social, political and economic environment shape us in significant ways.
According to this position, if in fact a world without government would be unfit for the
existence of property rights, it is not because our innate nature would give way to such a
condition (as the Hobbesian position asserts), it is because our acquired dispositions
prevent us from securing property without government.
Through an appeal to empirical sciences it will be shown that the Murphy and
Nagel account of human nature is not only untenable, but that the malleable theory of
human nature is closer to the truth. This will allow for the strong possibility that a
society can exist without a government and still have a working conception of property
rights.
On Hobbes's view, the lack of any settled right reason keeps people from living
together in peace (Lev I.5, I.13). The only way to achieve any stable peace is by
constituting some single right reason as sovereign (Lev I.5, I.17). Furthermore, the laws
of nature are principles of right reason that when followed allow for peace. Reason,
according to Hobbes, endorses the normative plan of this single right reason (Lev. I.13,
I.14), and this single right reason will compensate for the destructive differences of
natural right reasons. In other words, since all humans have the same unsavory nature,
they will all be in a similar state of nature that is void of peace and stability. The means
to achieve peace will be outlined through reason to create a leviathan society.
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Now, if human nature is innately constituted in such a way that a world without
government would necessarily be a state of unfettered chaos, as Hobbes claims, then this
claim must hold for all members of the species homo-sapiens to various yet sufficient
enough degrees that a world without government would persist as a state of unsavory
chaos. Thus, what we would find is that the standard for the development of human
societies around the world would have to be either unadulterated chaos or would be a
society that either has or is in the process of developing a strong political structure that is
relevantly similar. Anthropological evidence seems to show otherwise, thus providing a
snag for those who uphold a similar position on human nature. Because of the
multifarious structures of human societies throughout time and geography, some of which
were peaceful and had (have) little to no government, the Hobbesian picture of human
nature is importantly unsupported.
Unlike Hobbes, we have the luxury of a more enriched field of anthropology. We
have mapped the globe and marked the cultures of each region with vigorous scrutiny. It
is unlikely that we will exhaust this search for new cultures, for the Earth’s history is
massive and in many eras uncharted. However, we do have knowledge about enough
cultures for the sake of this argument. In short, what we are looking for is more than one
culture throughout recorded history that was both (a) stable and secure – i.e., its people
were not in constant war with other groups/states/tribes or they did not exhibit a relatively
high amount of internal chaos, and (b) did not operate under the leviathan political
control of an absolute sovereign or any other form of a strong government. These are the
two necessary requirements for arguing successfully against the Hobbesian position about
human nature.
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One does not have to look far in order to find societies that meet these
requirements. In fact, for most acephalous societies (also known as egalitarian or nonstratified societies), the two requirements we are looking for seem to be the standard
(Clark, 250-253). At the 1966 "Man the Hunter" conference, which was later transcribed
into a book, anthropologists Richard B. Lee and Irven DeVore claimed that
egalitarianism was one of several fundamental characteristics of hunting and gathering
societies (Lee and DeVore, 3-12).
These egalitarian societies typically portray the shared characteristics of having
little or no concept of political, social or economic hierarchies; they rarely operate under
permanent leadership, and their population rarely exceeds 100 people. For example, in
the Kalahari Desert, the !Kung, who are the oldest living inhabitants in modern Africa
(dating back 11,000 years ago 6 ), are a peaceful group who hold social stability as the
greatest good. They have an intricate system of gift giving and meat sharing that keeps
their society cohesive and harmonious. For some members of this society, all that they
are known to have is the result of gift giving (Marshall, 363). Furthermore, when asked
about the topic of theft, most !Kung could not even conceptually understand this
question. After living with the !Kung for some time, Lorna Marshall claimed that even
after leaving their unlocked and opened possessions in the open while away from the
camp, never did anything turn up missing. Things that were lost or forgotten, even two
cigarettes in a crumpled pack, were returned with haste (Marshall, 370). Interestingly
enough, the !Kung has little to no leadership. They have heads, which are usually earned
through age, and their function is virtually indistinguishable from the rest of the tribe

6

According to Lee, there is fossil evidence that places the !Kung in Africa 40,000 years ago. However,
this evidence, though intriguing, is not conclusive (Lee 1976, 5).
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(Thomas, 10). Here is a counterexample to the Hobbesian conception of human nature
and the need for a government in order to have stability. The !Kung are not only a
peaceful society without any form of government, they also have a working conception of
property rights (in so far as external objects belong to citizens of that tribe with the
special right to exclude other citizens from their use) that is both established and
respected among members of that society. Furthermore, anthropologists identify
acephalous societies to be “kin-ship” oriented, placing more importance on social
harmony and stability rather than wealth or status. Not only are these societies stable,
they appear to be harmonious and, based on our standards, relatively peaceful. Another
example can be found with the indigenous Australians of Northwest Arnhem Land who
arranged their entire society around a type of gift-giving, much like the !Kung. All
members of this tribe are expected to give any recourse they may have to any other
member who needs that recourse at any given time. Because of this social practice, they
lived in a state of relative peace, free from theft and poverty (Broome, 15-18). These are
two counterexample to the Hobbesian conception of human nature and the need for a
government in order to have stability. The !Kung and the indigenous Australians of
Northwest Arnhem Land are not only peaceful societies without any form of government,
they also have a working conception of property rights (in so far as external objects
belong to citizens of that tribe with the special right to exclude other citizens from their
use) that is both established and respected among members of that sociey. 7

7

One could argue that the !Kung is not an accurate counter-example because they are not a stable society
amongst power seeking, violent tribes. In other words, the peace they enjoy is due to the surrounding
tribes’ commitment to a government. Thus, they are not a valid counter-example. This position would not
undermine my position because: first, I have still shown the possibility of an acephalous society that has
something remotely approximating stable and secure holdings; second, all I am charged with doing
undermining the Hobbesian picture that secure and stable holdings in an acephalous society is not possible.
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In his paper, Notes on the Original Affluent Society, Marshall Sahlins directly
challenges the claim by Hobbes that the view of those in a state of nature – in this case
the hunter-gatherers – are living lives that are characterized as “solitary, poor, nasty,
brutish and short.” According to Sahlins, data indicates that hunter-gatherers worked
fewer hours, were well fed and enjoyed more leisure time than typical members of
industrial societies (Sahlins, 85-91).
This account of stable societies with minimal government are not only limited to
hunter-gatherer societies. There are numerous examples of sedentary Native American
tribes 8 . There are even examples of people that were citizens of a leviathan-esque,
monarchic society who moved to uncharted land, and created a peaceful society with
little to no government. This was the case in medieval Iceland, which grew to have
hundreds of thousands of citizens living in a stable and peaceful society with virtually no
government beyond informal, social agreements for several centuries (Byock, 51-67).
To sum up the conclusions of this section, in order for Murphy and Nagel to
justify the more charitable claim that it is practically impossible to have property without
government, they must make an appeal to human nature. As argued, there are two
plausible options for how human nature can be in order to justify their claim about
property: first, the Hobbesian account, which argues that humans are necessarily warlike, fear driven, and unable to cohabitate peacefully, thus making a world without
government practically impossible for property; second, an argument that human nature
is malleable, allowing for the environment to have a significant impact on human beings’
psychologies. Murphy and Nagel use the Hobbesian account of human nature to justify

8

Brandt, Richard. Hopi Ethics; Also, see Kawtko, Stacy. Nature and the Environment in Pre-Columbian
American Life; Also, see Keesing, Roger. Kin Groups and Social Structure.
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their position. However, this position is not as obvious as they make it out to be, and, at
best, it is highly questionable. In short, the Hobbesian version of human nature is simply
not compatible with available anthropological evidence.
If Murphy and Nagel still want to maintain that you can’t have property without
government, they must abandon the position that this claim is practically impossible, and
argue that it is simply possible (and true) that some societies do, in fact, need a
government in order to have a functioning system of property rights. However, by the
same token, some societies do not need a government in order to have property. In other
words, if a world without government would be Hobbes’s state of nature, it cannot be a
necessary claim that holds true of all humans in a state of nature. If it is true it can only
be true contingently for humans raised in a specific social and political environment.
Therefore, if some societies are unable to cohabitate peacefully without government, and
they further need government in order to have property, we are then left with one
alternative about human nature that can justify such a position - i.e., our nature is highly
adaptive, allowing for individuals to mold their personalities to the environment in which
they develop. The following section will look at evidence in various fields in light of this
final position on human nature.
In Russia between the 200 year periods of 1558 – 1721 there were continuous
wars, invasions by Tartars who took thousands of slaves, and even existing slavery within
the society. Gruesome atrocities were committed by the state, the church and even
citizens. Hunger and disease became a way of life. Both men and women regularly went
into voluntary slavery, trading freedom for security and food (Clark, 222).
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It is truly fascinating that such a horrific state of affairs would persist for as long
as they did in Russia during this time. This was the very question Russian historian
Richard Hellie pondered, and it wasn’t until he ran across Bruce Perry’s study on abused
children that he found a satisfying answer. The human brain adapts to its environment. It
tries to survive in a place that is not conducive for easy survival. However, this price
comes at a high cost, according to both Hellie and Perry co-coordinated study into
Russian culture during this period. They claimed that the whole of Russian society was
marked with chronic violence, a mode that was not only commonplace, but necessary for
survival at times. Everybody in that culture, according to Perry and Hellie, was
imprinted with “impulsivity of difficulty with abstract cognition, with a certain style of
problem-solving that in our current society we would label as post-traumatic stress
disorder, and maybe learning disorder, and maybe attention deficit disorder. But in that
society, it was the norm” (Clark, 222). In other words, it seems that in order to survive in
an otherwise horrific society, one must adapt to such a state that would appear to be
abnormal in less stressful societies.
It thus appears that the environment (society) in which one lives might play an
important role in shaping our moral personalities. If so, the norm of a society may not be
attributed to the innate nature of humans to create such circumstances; instead it might
seem that humans adapt to their environment (for better or worse) in order to survive.
Science not only supports this theory about the adaptive nature of the human personality,
but this theory about human nature accounts for the diversity of cultures and cultural
temperaments found through out history.
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In their book, Grizzly Heart, the world-renowned naturalist, Charlie Russell, and
his partner, Maureen Elms, were shocked after adopting and then returning to their
natural habitat three orphaned cubs that had been born in a zoo. To their surprise, the
cubs were able to survive in the wild without being shown by their mother how to
survive. As Russell and Elms observed the two cubs in their first moments of being on
their own, they were amazed to discover that the bears instinctively knew what plants to
eat, how to crack open acorns, climb trees, what plants were poisonous, how to catch fish,
and even how to seek-out and establish a den (Russell and Elma, 121-148). In other
words, the skills needed to be a bear are not learned. They are innate.
This is not the case for humans. At birth, a human’s brain is not well organized.
Only the most rudimentary neural pathways are established leaving it unable to crawl or
even seek out its mother’s nipple. It is not until we are 20 weeks old that our neurons are
organized well enough to allow us the ability to hold our heads up and extend our arms.
Furthermore, we are born with a set number of approximately 100 billion nerve cells in
our brain. Unable to reproduce or spawn new nerve neuron cells, most of these stay with
us throughout our lives. However, an adult’s brain grows nearly four times as big as it
was at birth. With no new material being formed in the brain, what accounts for this
growth throughout a person’s life is a massive increase in the number of synapses (or
connections) between these nerve cells. The brain thus goes through an extreme process
of organization throughout a child’s early life (which extends into adulthood, yet
comparatively slows down) (Clark, 194-195).
With the potential for neurons to connect in multi-trillions of possible ways, there
are approximately 15,000 set synapses developed by age 3. This is 6 times more than are
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present at birth, and many more than are present in an adult’s brain. This temporary
increase in synapses allows children to absorb information in massive volumes. This
highly malleable “learners brain” maintains this ability until age 10, at which time the
brain begins to discard the connections not needed or rarely used. This is why it is much
easier to learn new languages as a child, and why it becomes increasingly more difficult
with age (Clark, 195-196). Thus, being born with limited innate knowledge about being
human, much of who we become and what we know, even the most seemingly basic
activities, are learned from our environment.
Within the age old debate of nature vs. nurture, it is unlikely that the answer is
one over the other, and more likely a combination of both. However, through the
incorporation of biology into the debate it is apparent that nurture plays a much more
significant role in determining who and what we become. In his book, Savage Girls and
Wild Boys, Michael Newton provides the most shocking and well documented cases
amongst hundreds of feral children. There are a few cases of children that were
discovered in the wild living amongst social groups of various species, and all of which
were found either during this crucial early years of their development or just years after.
Some that were found living with wolves were reported to be acting as wolves act. They
were walking on all fours, eating raw meat, and exhibited no human behaviors at all
(Newton, 182-207). Furthermore, once discovered by society the children were rarely
able to acquire normal language, mental and social skills. Their brains and bodies had
acquired the skills for survival in the environment in which they developed. Thus, their
behavior mimicked that of wolves (or whatever species adopted them). Unlike cubs,
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humans do not innately know how to become human. That only occurs after they have
interacted with other humans, from whom they learn how to become one.
Feral children are a spurious topic due to the rare and poorly documented nature
of most cases. However, the idea that there is a window for the acquisition of proper
mental and social skills early in a human’s life is not only defended by biology, but also
psychology and cognitive development. Freud argued that our personalities are fully
formed by the age of five. His contemporary, Alfred Adler argues that our environment
from the moment of birth is what we use to establish who we are to become (Adler, 111).
This idea was later picked up by Jean Piaget whose observations with children’s
development lead him to conclude that:
Far from being a source of fully elaborated “innate ideas,” the maturation of the
nervous system can do no more than determine the totality of possibilities and
impossibilities at a given stage. A particular social environment remains
indispensable for the realization of these possibilities (Piaget, 436).

The idea that our early childhood is the most crucial period for proper psychological
development is commonplace for most psychologists. If during this time infants do not
receive adequate care and standard contact with a social group, their mental development
will be severely stymied. Thus, humans have a window for acquiring proper social,
mental and linguistic skills. This was the thesis put forth by Eric Lenneberg in his
seminal 1964 paper, The Capacity of Language Acquisition, which suggests that if
children do not receive the adequate attention from a social group of their species, their
brains will not develop properly as the following case suggests:
At the age of thirteen, Genie was finally discovered by authorities after
undergoing one of the most brutal periods of child abuse ever recorded. Her father,
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Clark, tied her to a chair during the day, and the tied her in a sleeping bag at night. The
only noise she was accustomed to was her father either growling or yelling profanities at
her. When found, she was mute and incontinent, crawled on all fours, and understood
nothing that was said to her; she didn’t even know how to properly masticate food,
instead she put the food in her mouth, let the saliva absorb it and then spit the remainder
of the mush on her clothes. But this was not because of retardation. With in 4 years of
foster care and with extensive counseling, she was taught how to speak some language
and social skills. In short, her case, as unfortunate as it was, provided empirical evidence
to Lenneberg’s theory, and helped prove that there is in fact a critical window for proper
development in a child’s life (Newton, 208-228).
This need of human infants for an environment of other humans to allow for the
process of normal development is present in other primate species with a strong social
instinct like ours. This became evident in Harry Harlow’s essay, Early Social
Deprivation and Later Behavior in the Monkey. In what some would consider an
unconscionable experiment that involved depriving baby rhesus monkeys of all social
contact from other members of their species, Harlow was able to scientifically
demonstrate the importance of companionship in the early stages of primate
development. In this experiment, Harlow had made test groups: the first group of
monkey had no contact with other rhesus monkeys, and lived in total isolation. Each was
observed to have spent most of its lives huddled in a corner, holding its knees and
rocking. Each developed a behavioral pattern that exhibited autism. The second group
was given a furry toy animal that resembled an adult rhesus monkey, and though their
symptoms were still sub-par, they were significantly better off than the group left in
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isolation. Furthermore, the third group, consisted of orphaned monkeys placed together
in a single cage, exhibited behavioral patterns that were better off than the second group.
These experiments provide further scientific proof that primates – including humans –
biologically and psychologically require social nurturing in order to develop according to
social norms.
In conclusion, the predominantly malleable nature of the human brain throughout
early human development is not only the position about human nature that accounts for
our anthropological findings, and both biological and psychological evidence supports, it
is the one aspect of human nature that political philosophy would do well to
acknowledge. Failure to give such empirical findings proper credit might lead to
fallacious and hasty generalizations found when discussing human nature. Thinkers have
attributed the standard/normal psyche for citizens in their society (and societies like their
own) to all humans in all situations. We should be careful not to generalize from a few
isolated examples of uncooperative chaos to claims about human nature.
If we are unable to successfully live in a world void of government it is because
our socialization, for better or worse, has made our psychological and physical stability
dependant on the existence of government. In light of the evidence that supports this
conception of human nature, Murphy and Nagel must once again revise their position on
property. They have failed to show that property is logically dependant on the existence
of government, and they have failed to show that it is highly improbable that a society
can exist without a government and still have property rights. In light of the other
alternative for supporting their claim about property, they must drastically revise their
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position to say that only some societies need a government in order to have property,
which is ultimately unassuming at best.

IV. the Scope of a Government’s Role in Property

With the evidence for human nature being that of a malleable state, allowing for a
vast difference in a culture’s general personality, it makes sense that some societies may
not be able to obtain the possibility of property without a government. In fact, it appears
that the more diverse, complex and largely populated a society, the less likely it will be
that that society can operate with the social convention of property without an
overarching government to guarantee and enforce the right. However, this does not mean
that property can only exist through the existence of a government.
In fact, this was (and for some small tribes it still is) the reality for a multitude of
pre-colonial, tribal communities. Craig Galbraith, Carlos Rodriguez, and Curt Stiles
assert in the recent book, Self Determination: the Other Path for Native Americans, that
“pre-colonial indigenous populations had a highly developed sense of individual private
property” (7). The conception of private property was so developed for the farmingbased tribes that it extended to land rights that were established and respected by various
tribes. Interestingly enough, almost all of the land inhabited by the farm-based tribes
scattered throughout pre-colonial America were family owned, and remained that way as
long as the land was used to make improvements to its natural state. The Lummi tribe of
the northern Puget Sound went as far as allowing individual property to be inherited.
Furthermore, individual slave ownership and trade were prevalent among pre-colonial
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indigenous tribes. Intertribal slave markets, particularly in Canada, were well established
with indexed prices in terms copper plates, blankets, horses and other commodities
(Galbraith/Rodriguez/Stiles, 10). Furthermore, while some regions organized into state
level cities, most were either nomadic or lived sedentary lives in farming communities.
For the most part, these tribes were small communities that were governed, if at all, by a
system of chiefdom. 9
In looking at these examples, which are just a few amongst many 10 , we can
conclude that like modern societies, pre-colonial Native Americans did have a conception
of private property that was the norm within their communities. The question remains
whether these tribal based communities had a government that allowed for the possibility
of a meaningful practice of private ownership. In other words, one could still maintain
the position that you cannot have property without government, and extend the definition
of a government to consist of sedentary, chiefdom tribes or even informal hunter-gatherer
communities. This very question is the basis of the second criticism to Murphy and
Nagel’s claim about property rights.
There are two positions one can take in light of the pre-colonial tribal based
communities. The first position I will call the Lockeian position, which was loosely
articulated by Locke in the Second Treatise of Government (13-16). This position claims
that the pre-colonial Native Americans had a conception of property rights without any
form of government. In other words, the sedentary and hunter-gatherer societies,
including those under chiefdom rule, had a loose structure that made decisions for the

9

In the book, The Transition to Statehood in the New World, the anthropologist Robert Carneiro concisely
defines this system as “an autonomous political unit comprising a number of villages or communities under
the permanent control of a paramount chief" (45).
10
Similar examples amongst aborigines can be found in L.R. Hiatt’s book, Kinship and Conflict
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better of the community, but these structures were not sufficient to be considered
governments. The second position I will call the Murphy/Nagel position because it
supports and allows for their claim that there can be no property without government. It
asserts that the pre-colonial Native American communities did operate with a system of
government, and that any community gathering that makes decisions about the good of a
community is considered a government, whether it be a simple gathering of members or a
more advanced system of chiefdoms.
Simply put, the pre-colonial indigenous tribes had a working understanding of
private property – the evidence is too glaring to argue against such a position. Therefore,
they either had a system of government that allowed for this practice, which is what
Murphy and Nagel want (and indeed have)to say, or they did not have a government,
which argues in favor of a Lockeian conception of property rights as being natural – i.e.,
existing prior to any legal conventions. Murphy and Nagel face a dilemma if they
maintain the position that the pre-colonial indigenous tribes did have a government,
which allows them to sustain their claim that we cannot have property without
government. If this is so, then a system of government exists that is supported without
any tax money. This seems to conflict with the second claim in their argument on
property, which claims that there can be no government without taxes.
On the other hand, for Murphy and Nagel’s second claim to be true, then they will
have to uphold that the pre-colonial indigenous tribes did not have a government. If
Murphy and Nagel shift to the Lockeian position in order to support the premise that we
cannot have government without taxes, then they are forced to drop their first claim,
which holds that there can be no property without government.
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Without firmly defining the scope of government, Murphy and Nagel seem to be
equivocating between two conceptions of government in order to defend their main
argument. Their position, thus, utilizes different necessary conditions for each
conception of a government, which is needed to maintain their primary argument. For
their first claim (premise) to be true – there can be no property without government Murphy and Nagel must uphold the position that the pre-colonial indigenous tribes did
have a government. However, this means that a system of taxes is not a necessary
requirement for defining a government, and thus there second claim can be true. On the
other hand, for their second claim (premise) to be true – there can be no government
without taxes - Murphy and Nagel must re-establish the necessary conditions for
government to include a tax system. However, if they uphold the Lockeian position that
there was no government amongst the pre-colonial Native American tribes, they must
abandon their first claim.
The purpose of this paper is not to argue in favor of one position over the other.
However, the evidence presented in the previous section on human nature seems to
account for the diversity throughout the multitude of human societies, which also allows
for the possibility of respected property rights without the existence of a strong
government. It thus seems (and evidence proves) that humans can be born into a society
that operates under an informal system of property rights that needs no government to
guarantee such rights.
However, it seems that one avenue of avoiding this dilemma just presented to
Murphy and Nagel would be to redefine what they mean by taxes. In doing so, they
would have to establish taxes to include any activity given, including simply offering
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one’s free time, to the government of that community for the sake of making community
decisions. Though this is obviously not what they have in mind in their book when
discussing taxes, to loosely redefine taxes to include these conditions would lead to an
assortment of problems. Treating the contribution of one’s free time as a tax would strike
most of us as counterintuitive since we both give it freely and we can withhold it without
threat of significant coercive penalty. However we cast what a tax is, In order to sustain
their position, Murphy and Nagel seem committed to an overboard notion of “tax.”
Another possible way out of this dilemma is for Murphy and Nagel to claim that
there is a distinct difference between property and holdings, and unless a government is
present, all one may possess is that which they hold and are willing and able to maintain
through force. In order to have property we need an overarching power to define and,
most importantly, enforce these rights. Thus, without a strong coercive power in the
form of government, the post-colonial Native American tribes this paper uses as
counterexamples against the Murphy and Nagel position merely offers a system of
holdings, not property.
In order for this thesis to sustain, it, like any theoretical position about the nature
of reality, must account for empirical observations. In light of this truth, Murphy and
Nagel must hold the position that the pre-colonial Native Americans, who, as we have
seen, had a strong understanding of private possessions, which entailed exclusionary
rights amongst members of the same tribe, did not have a system of property. Through
this claim, Murphy and Nagel seem to be adding a suspicious necessary requirement to
the definition of property. In other words, their theory maintains that government is
necessary in order to have property. However, there are numerous examples of
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communities that had little or no government and, in what appears in every significant
respect, to have had a system of property.
Granted, the post-colonial Native Americans may have had a system of informal
convention that masqueraded as property, when in fact it was simply a functioning
system of holdings of its members; however, as history showed, these holdings were not
respected by foreign (European) invaders who claimed their land and labor through force,
and justified by Locke. One needs to look no further than the Europeans overpowering
Native Americans to see that without a strong government to insure the respect of the
property rights of its citizens, a society’s holdings will remain in threat of becoming the
property of those with both the will and power to take them.
What this argument fails to recognize is the similarity of ownership within almost
every existing society. Private property can be found from in even the most egalitarian
societies we know of. The !Kung, for example, live in such an egalitarian society, and
even though their system is supported by an on going gift giving tradition, tools, spears
and clothes are respected as private property of those that made them. Within their
community, they are allowed to dispose of or exclude anyone else who participates
within the community (Shostak, 8-9). In other words, without a complex coercive power
to enforce such a right, this right exists none the less inside the community. A similar
system exists in the Native American tribes mentioned above. However, there is a
respect of insider property by outsiders of that community. This became evident with the
annual inter-tribal markets that successfully flourished for thousands of years.
Like any society, even in complex, industrialized, diverse and strongly governed
societies like the United States, which has volumes of legalese to establish the legal
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definition of what constitutes property, these post-colonial Native American societies had
an informal convention that successfully defined and enforced a system of property. Like
property rights in any existing society, one was allowed to exclude another from using
their property, and theft amongst insiders was forbidden. That is, until foreigners
overpowered their system.
Even though history shows that a strong government may provide for further
defense of its community’s property rights, it does not show that property only exists
within the confines of a government. Owned objects with exclusionary rights, respected
by the insiders a community, are commonplace in human societies, and it is within the
community, no matter how large, that the right of property is enacted. What both history
and anthropology shows us is that the existence of a strong government is not necessary
for the successful function of property rights within a community. Even within an
industrialized society that operates under a strong government and vast military, a more
powerful country could (and has) conquered and claimed the country, and in turn
restructured the defined property of that community to fit its own agenda.

V. Conclusion

Murphy and Nagel assert that we have no entitlement to our pretax income
because of two premises: first, there can be no property without government and second,
there can be no government without taxes. They attempt to support this claim by
conveniently adopting a Hobbesian conception of human nature, which does not allow
for the possibility of property without the existence of government. Thus in order to have
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property, we must have a government, and a government can only exist through a system
of taxes. In showing that Murphy and Nagel are equivocating between their conception
of government to support both of their premises, it is apparent that their claim is too bold.
They must admit that we can either have property without government, or that we can
have government without taxes. Either way, it appears that we may be entitled to more of
our pretax income than Murphy and Nagel want to admit.
Regardless of whether property arose out of a natural right or convention, it is
positive that a government is not needed to define property. Murphy and Nagel, like so
many before them, defend a position on property rights that in inconsistent with empirical
observations in history, anthropology, psychology and biology. Like anyone that
maintains the position that you cannot have property without government, invariably,
when pressed, they must uphold a position about human nature that can account for this
claims veracity. It is not a logical impossibility to conceive of a society of humans that
peacefully adopted an informal convention of property rights, and have little to no
government. In fact, there are numerous examples of such tribes through history. Thus,
for the role of government to be necessary, we must need the policing, and coercive
nature of government to enforce and guarantee these rights. It is because of the sufficient
level of chaos without a government that keeps the possibility of property impossible.
Murphy and Nagel, like so many philosophers before them, invoke a concrete and
distinct theory on human nature that, if true, guarantees the claim’s truth. If humans are
indeed by nature so ill-disposed to cooperation, then a system like property, which
requires a level of respect for others not naturally found, is not possible. However, like
so many philosophers before, Murphy and Nagel make commit the fallacy of hasty
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generalization: they take human nature to be universally in accord with the general
psychology of their society. Without taking into account humans’ natural and extremely
strong ability to adapt to their environments, thus making their nature more malleable
than concrete, it is easy to see how one might reach such a conclusion. However, it is
simply such a conclusion is unsupported once one looks at the diversity amongst people
through out a large range of social systems. Thus, once we incorporate anthropology,
biology and psychology into both inquiries into human nature and the possibility of
property without government, we are able to see that it is possible (and is prevalent
throughout recorded history) to have property without government.
Murphy and Nagel assert that in order to have property, we must have a
government, and a government can only exist through a system of taxes. In showing that
Murphy and Nagel are equivocating between their conception of government to support
both of their premises, it is apparent that their claim is too bold. They must admit that we
can either have property without government, or that we can have government without
taxes. Either way, it appears that we may be entitled to more of our pretax income than
Murphy and Nagel want to admit.
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